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The Current Status
of The Home Office
Deduction
Reconsidering the Focal Point Test
By Clifford E. Hutton, Ph.D., CPA
Darlene A. Smith, Ph.D., CPA
Taxpayers who engage in a single trade or business at
more than one location might want to consider taking a
deduction for the expenses of a home office. A recent
decision of the Seventh Circuit, following two decisions by
the Second Circuit, has expanded the availability of the
home office deduction by construing more liberally what
constitutes a “principal place of business.” The Ninth
Circuit recently sided with the Tax Court in a case
involving the focal point test, but elected not to criticize
the decisions in the Second and Seventh Circuits. In
response to these decisions, the Tax Court has abandoned
the “focal point” test in appropriate cases. This article
includes a review of the decisions to provide guidance to
the practitioner whose clients could benefit from this new
interpretation.

The Tax Court’s “Focal Point” Test
The home office deduction is governed by Section 280A
of the Internal Revenue Code, added by Congress in the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 and amended in 1981, to provide
“definitive rules relating to deductions for expenses
attributable to the business use of homes”1 for the guid
ance of taxpayers and the courts, and in hope of reducing
the tide of related litigation. The general rule of Section
280A disallows any deduction for individuals for the use of
a dwelling unit that the individual has used as a residence
during the taxable year. Some exceptions are allowed. A
taxpayer may deduct the expenses for business use which
can be allocated to the portion of his or her dwelling unit
used “exclusively” and “on a regular basis” as “the princi
pal place of business for any trade or business of the
taxpayer.”2 For a taxpayer-employee, the deduction is
allowed only if the home office is used “for the conven
ience of the employer.”3
In an earlier case, Baie v. Commissioned, the Tax Court
established a “focal point” test, which it still uses in
appropriate cases, to determine the location of a
taxpayer’s principal place of business. Baie operated a hot
dog stand separate from her home, but because of limited
space at the stand, she prepared all the food for the stand
in her kitchen, and did all the bookkeeping necessary for

the business in a home office. Her home office expenses
were not allowed as the Tax Court concluded that the hot
dog stand, not her home, was the “focal point” of her
activities because that was where the goods and services
were provided to the customers.

After Baie, the Tax Court consistently applied the focal
point test to evaluate home office deductions. This test
identifies the principal place of business as the place
where goods and services are provided to customers or
where income is produced. In general, for an employee,
the courts have found that the focal point of an employee’s
primary source of income is the employer’s facilities. The
Tax Court has also held that “the number of hours of use
alone does not necessarily determine whether an office
qualifies as the taxpayer’s principal place of business.”5
The Second and Seventh Circuits
Overturn the “Focal Point” Test
In Drucker v. Commissioned and Weissman v. Commis
sioner7, the Second Circuit found the Tax Court’s sourceof-income concept in the “focal point” test to be too
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limiting, and instead adopted a test
that weighed the time and impor
tance of the employment-related
activities performed in the home
office.
Drucker, a concert musician
employed by the New York Metro
politan Opera, practiced 30 hours a
week in a room in his apartment
used exclusively as his private
practice studio. The Tax Court held
that since the taxpayer was in the
“trade or business" of being an
employee of the Metropolitan Opera,
his “focal point” or principal place of
business was the same as that of his
employer. Rejecting this view, the
Second Circuit found “this the rare
situation in which an employee’s
principal place of business is not that
of his employer. Both in time and
importance, home practice was the
‘focal point’ of the appellant musi
cians’ employment-related activi
ties.”8 Drucker spent less than half
his working time at his employer’s
place of business, and that work was
made possible only by his home
practice. In fact, her performed in
many places, with the majority of his
preparation occurring at his home.
Where he performed was immaterial,
as long as he was prepared.
Drucker’s use of a home office was
found to be “for the convenience of
the employer” since practice was a
condition of employment and the
employer provided no space for
practice. Having met those tests,
Drucker’s home office expense was
tax deductible.
The application of Drucker to
other situations might have been
limited by the fact that it was based
on a “rare situation,” but the Second
Circuit Court followed and expanded
the same reasoning in Weissman.
Questioning the usefulness of the
“focal point” test when a taxpayer’s
occupation involves distinct but
related activities, the court reasoned
that “the ‘focal point’ approach
creates a risk of shifting attention to
the place where a taxpayer’s work is
more visible, instead of the place
where the dominant portion of his
work is accomplished.”9 Weissman, a
college professor, spent 80% of his
time in scholarly research and
writing which the Tax Court agreed
was a condition of his continued
employment. It was also agreed that
he used his home office exclusively
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and on a regular basis for these
employment-related activities. But
the Tax Court held that the long
standing presumption relating to
college professors, that a teacher’s
principal place of business is the
school at which he teaches, was not

A taxpayer may deduct the
expenses for business use
which can be allocated to
the portion of his or her
dwelling unit...
overcome by the fact that he spent a
majority of his working time in his
home office. In contrast to Drucker,
where no practice space was pro
vided by the employer, Weissman
was provided shared office space on
campus. However, it was not suitable
space for engaging in the necessary
employment-related activities since it
did not provide privacy for thought,
working space and storage for his
papers, or even a typewriter - all
necessary for his writing and re
search. The Second Circuit held that
his use of a home office was not a
matter of personal convenience, but
was for the convenience of the
employer.
The Seventh Circuit in Meiers v.
Commissioner10 followed the Second
Circuit in disagreeing with the Tax
Court’s application of the focal point
test, noting that “it places undue
emphasis upon the location where
goods and services are provided to
customers and income is generated,
not necessarily where work is
predominantly performed.”11 John
and Sally Meiers owned and operated
a self-service laundromat which had
five part-time employees. As the
manager, Mrs. Meiers averaged one
hour a day at the laundromat filling
the coin changer, collecting money
from the machines and assisting
customers. She spent two hours a
day in her home office where she
fulfilled her primary responsibility
for the business: keeping the books
and performing other managerial
tasks. It was undisputed that the
home office was used exclusively and
regularly for business purposes, and
that the decision to make office space
in the home rather than in the

laundromat was a legitimate business
decision. The Tax Court again ruled
that the principal place of business
was the laundromat because the
income was generated and services
were provided to the customers
there. They also noted that the
number of hours the home office was
used did not necessarily determine
whether the office would qualify as
the principal place of business.
In reversing the Tax Court, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the length
of time a taxpayer spends in the
home office compared to other
locations should be the major factor
in determining the taxpayer’s
principal place of business. Other
factors to be considered are “the
importance of the business functions
performed by the taxpayer in the
home office, the business necessity
of maintaining a home office, and the
expenditures of the taxpayer to
establish a home office.”12 As noted
in Weissman, these standards are
similar to the standards detailed in
Proposed Regulation Section 1.280A2(b) (2):
Determination of principal place of
business. When a taxpayer engages
in a single trade or business at more
than one location, it is necessary to
determine the taxpayer’s principal
place of business for that trade or
business in light of all the facts and
circumstances. Among the facts and
circumstances to be taken into
account in making this determination
are the following:
(i) The portion of the total income
from the business which is attribut
able to activities at each location;
(ii) The amount of time spent in
activities related to that business at
each location; and
(iii) The facilities available to the
taxpayer at each location for pur
poses of that business.13
Both the Second and Seventh
Circuit argue that applying these
factors to evaluate home office
expenses deductions would carry out
the intent of Congress in establishing
Section 280A to prevent the conver
sion of non-deductible personal
expenses into deductible business
expenses without preventing the
legitimate deduction of necessary
business expenses.
In granting a deduction for the
Meiers’ home office expenses, the
Seventh Circuit based their decision

on these factors: 1) the majority of
Mrs. Meiers’ time was spent in the
home office, and her most important
business functions were performed
there, 2) it was a legitimate business
decision to create the office space at
home rather than at the laundromat,
and 3) this was not an attempt to
convert non-deductible personal
expenses into deductible business
expenses.
Only one additional case has
reached an appeals court since this
apparent liberalization of the focal
point test. In Pomarantz v. Commis
sioner14, the Ninth Circuit sided with
the Tax Court without criticizing the
decisions of the Second and Seventh
Circuits. Pomarantz was an emer
gency room physician, acting as an
independent contractor, who con
tracted to provide services to a
hospital. He performed all of his
patient services at the hospital and
did not meet with patients in his
home. He spent the majority of his
working hours at the hospital, but
used his home office for studying,
writing, and patient care follow-up.
The hospital did not furnish a private
office, but Pomarantz had access to a
work area, call room, and physician’s
lounge.
The Ninth Circuit determined that,
under any standard applied either by
the Tax Court or by the Second and
Seventh Circuit Courts, the focal
point of Pomarantz’s business was
the hospital and not his home office.
Pomarantz spent an insubstantial
amount of time working in his home
office. He had access to a work area
at the hospital and performed a
substantial portion of his administra
tive and patient follow-up duties at
the hospital. The duties performed at
home were incidental rather than
substantial. Therefore, his home
office deduction was properly denied.
The Tax Court’s New Position
In response to the Second and
Seventh District’s decisions, the Tax
Court has adopted a new position. In
Soliman15 the Court stated that it will
no longer follow the “focal point” test
in cases in which a taxpayer’s home
office is essential to the taxpayer’s
business, the taxpayer spends
substantial time there, and there is
no other location available to perform
the office functions of the business.
Soliman, a physician, used a room in

his apartment exclusively to manage
his medical practice. He had no other
office space available to him. His
business activities at his home office
were essential to his medical practice
but were ancillary to the primary
income-generating services he
performed at hospitals. The Court
determined that where a taxpayer’s
occupation requires essential organi
zational and management activities
that are distinct from those that
generate income, the place where the
business is managed can be the
principal place of business.
At first glance, Soliman appears
very similar to Pomarantz. the
primary difference noted by the Tax
Court was the amount of time spent
in Soliman’s home office. Soliman
spent over 30 percent of his working
hours in his office. In contrast spent
an insubstantial amount of time
(between 150 and 250 hours per
year) working in his office. Another
significant factor was Soliman’s lack
of other office space. Pomarantz had
access to a work area at the hospital
and performed a substantial portion
of his administrative functions at the
hospital.
The Tax Court reached a similar
result in Kahaku v. Commissioner16.
Kahaku, a professional guitarist,
maintained a home office which he
used exclusively and regularly in his
business as a musician. He practiced
30 hours per week in his home office
and maintained his business records
there. Kahaku performed 8 to 12
hours a week in a restaurant. His
home office was held to be his
principal place of business with
respect to his business as a musician.

Conclusion
In deciding whether a client who
engages in a single trade or business
at more than one location has a basis
for deducting a home office expense,
several factors must be considered.
The first is to expect that the IRS will
continue to apply the focal point test.
Whether the taxpayer will prevail in
court depends upon the acceptance
of the more liberal views of the
Second and Seventh Circuits.
Second, for each location the amount
of time spent, the type and impor
tance of the business activities, the
income attributable, and the facilities
available for business purposes need
to be determined. Third, if the

employer provides space, is it
suitable and adequate for the re
quired employment-related activities?
The answer to this question relates
not only to the “convenience of the
employer” test, but also to the
determination of the “principal place
of business.”
Section 280A (c) (5) limits the
deduction for home office expenses
to the net taxable income from the
trade or business before the deduc
tion for the home office expenses. In
the case of an employee, the resul
tant deduction is also considered a
miscellaneous itemized deduction
and will be allowed only to the extent
the total miscellaneous itemized
deductions exceed 2 percent of
adjusted gross income. In spite of
these limitations, many taxpayers
may derive substantial tax benefits
from the new interpretation of the
principal place of business by the Tax
Court.
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